Im Rahmen der Special Online Conference on Experimental Insights from Behavioral Economics on Covid-19 der JHU Hopkins Business of Health Initiative und des LSE Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science stellte Victoria Fast mit einem Video das Forschungsprojekt Incentivizing Data Donations and the Adoption of Contact-Tracing Apps – A Randomized Controlled Online Experiment on the German Corona-Warn-App vor.
Abstract:
Contact-tracing apps constitute a key pillar of many nations’ public health strategy to contain the Covid-19 pandemic. However, the effectiveness of digital contract-tracing efforts crucially depends on widespread app adoption and usage among citizens and requires individuals’ willingness to donate their personal data for the greater good. Despite the large social benefits, evidence on the effectiveness of incentives to stimulate adoption and usage of contact-tracing apps is scarce. Whereas monetary payments for app installation or usage provide users with a direct economic benefit, research in related health domains has found that such extrinsic incentives may crowd out intrinsic motivation and pro-social behavior. Therefore, we conduct a randomized controlled online experiment with German students to evaluate the effectiveness of different incentives in encouraging participants to install and use the "Corona-Warn-App" provided by the German federal government. We run four treatments in which (i) no monetary compensation, (ii) payment for app installation (iii) payment for app usage and (iv) a choice between non-monetary compensation and payment is offered to prospective users of the contact-tracing app. We find that monetary compensation schemes are effective in significantly increasing app installation and verified app usage measured 14 days after installation. Although ex-post payment for app usage yields lower installation rates than up-front payments for installation, it exhibits the lowest attrition rate in usage and thus leads to highest long-term usage. Non-monetary compensation is found to be ineffective in increasing installation rates or usage beyond outcomes of monetary incentives, suggesting that there is no substantial crowding-out with respect to data donations. Altogether, our findings provide empirical evidence on how governments can effectively encourage adoption of contract-tracing apps to slow the spread of Covid-19 before vaccines can establish herd immunity.
Vorgestellte Forschungsarbeit:
Fast, V. & Schnurr, D. (2021).
Incentivizing Data Donations and the Adoption of Contact-Tracing Apps –A Randomized Controlled Online Experiment on the German Corona-Warn-App
Das Video und weitere Informationen zur Konferenz sind unter dem folgenden Link zu finden: https://hbhi.jhu.edu/?page_id=179